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Climate change poses severe threats to developing countries. Scientists predict
entire states (e.g. Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Maldives) will become
inhabitable. People living in these states have to resettle to other countries. Media
and politicians warn that climate change will trigger migration flows in dimensions
unknown to date. It is feared that millions from developing countries overwhelm
developed societies and increase pressures on anyway ailing social support systems
destabilizing societies and becoming a potential source of conflict.
Inhabitants of Pacific Islandsa have been mobile since the islands were first settled
not longer than 3,500 years ago. Since then people moved around, expanded their
reach, and traded with neighbouring tribes (and later countries). With the event of
European powers in the 15th century independent mobility became restricted after
the beginning of the 19th century. From the second half of the 19th century
movements of people predominately served economic interests of colonial powers,
in particular a huge colonial appetite for labour. After independence emigration from
Pacific Island countries continued to serve economic interest of metropolitan
countries at the rim of the Pacific Ocean, which are able to direct migration flows
according to their economic requirements.
If climate change resettlements become necessary in big numbers then Pacific
Islanders do not want to become climate change refugees. To include environmental
reasons in refugee conventions is not what Pacific Islanders want. They want to
migrate in dignity, if it becomes unavoidable to leave their homes. There are good
reasons to solve the challenges within Pacific Island societies and do not depend too
much on metropolitan neighbours at the rim of the Pacific such as Australia, New
Zealand and the USA. To rise to the challenge requires enhanced Pan-Pacific Island
solidarity and South-South cooperation. This then would result in a reduction of
dependencies. For metropolitan powers still much can be done in supporting
capacity building in Pacific Island countries and helping the economies to proposer
so that climate change migrants easier can be absorbed by expanding labour
markets in Pacific Island countries.2015 Weber; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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Setting the challenges
Climate Change has become one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century.
For many years it has been seen from a perspective of mitigation: what can be done to
prevent climate change from happening? Today’s major concerns are: how can societies
adjust, adapt to or at least cope with the impacts arising from climate change? In this
discourse the question is, if moving away is a suitable adaptation strategy, or an ac-
knowledgement that adaptation has failed.
In the past mobility played an outstanding role in the lives of Pacific Islanders. After
the first had arrived some 3,500 years ago they then moved around freely. Later, colo-
nial powers in the request for increasing labour shifted hundreds of thousands of
people within the Pacific Island region. When supply of labourers within Pacific Islands
faded they brought migrant workers from outside. Once Pacific Island countries be-
came independent the mobility of its people did not abate; many more moved to coun-
tries at the rim of the Pacific.
Today the threat of climate change, sea-level rise and the risk of becoming inhabitable
are real issues for many Pacific Islands. New motivations to go elsewhere appear on
the horizon; yet there are little ideas how resettlement can be managed, if and once
required. The paper thus is a beginning to envision how to avoid that climate change
migrants become refugees. Migrant receiving countries do not wish to be flooded by
huge waves of refugees putting strain on their social, economic and political systems. At
the same time no migrant prefers to be a refugee; they all wish to be welcome wherever
they have to turn to when their time at home runs out. All wish to be able to support
themselves and their families through the skills they have acquired. No one wishes to
live in uncertainty, without proper means of livelihoods and threatened to be sent away
or punished just because it wasn’t possible to stay in the countries they came from.
The Pacific Island region
The Pacific Ocean covers more than 165 million square kilometres extending to about
a third of the surface of the Earth. With this it is the biggest geographical entity on
Planet Earth. The Pacific Islands consists of 20,000 – 30,000 islands located south of
the Tropic of Cancer (Ridgell 2006). As a rough indication the region is sub-divided
into Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and Timor Leste, which lies further west to
the actual Pacific islands. The islands of the first sub-division are mainly situated north
of the equator and those of the second and third category as well as Timor Leste are
situated in the southern hemisphere (Figure 1).
All except one (Tongab) had been colonies of foreign powers. Compared to the
Americas and Asia colonialism started rather late and for most Pacific Islands the colo-
nial period didn’t last even 100 years. The first to become independent was Samoa in
1962 and the last Timor Leste where a civil war after a referendum in 1999 delayed for-
mal independence from Indonesia until 2002.
Today most islands in the region belong to 15 independent states. Some islands, namely
those belonging to American Samoa (USA), French Polynesia (France), Tokelau (New
Zealand), Wallis & Futuna (France), Guam (USA), Northern Mariana Islands (USA), and
New Caledonia (France) are governed by a metropolitan power. Two Pacific ACP countries
(Cook Islands and Niue) are in a free association with New Zealand. This includes New
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shall Islands, and Palau) form a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the USA. The cit-
izens of these countries are free to live and work in the United States (Hills 1984).
Pacific Island countries and territories (incl. Timor Leste) comprise a total land area
of a bit more than 565,000 km2 (Table 1). With their combined land areas they are
roughly as big as Kenya. Papua New Guinea, the world’s second biggest island next to
Greenland, alone has more than 80 percent leaving the remaining 14 states and seven
territories with a bit more than 100,000 km2, about the size of South Korea.
On the other hand the water body around the islands is tremendous: the combined
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of all 15 Pacific Island countries and territories is al-
most 25 million km2. With this they cover an area considerably bigger than Russia, the
world’s largest country and almost three times the land area of China. Distances within
the Pacific Island region are huge and transportation costs, both for people as well as
goods, are expensive, especially as a result of rising costs for fossil fuels.
Pacific Islanders have been amongst the most mobile peoples over centuries. Take the
tiny country of Niue, which today has a population of not even 1,500 and where an-
other 6,000 live mainly in New Zealand. Or the people of the Cook Islands: some
15,000 of them live at home, whilst more than the same number live around the Pacific
Rim, mainly in New Zealand (Campbell and Bedford 2014). Also other countries, where
no dual citizenship with one of the metropolitan countries in their vicinity exists, have
meaningful sections of their population outside their territories. Samoa, with a popula-
tion at home of around 190,000, has another 120,000 people living overseas, mainly in
New Zealand (World Bank 2011). Similarly, Tonga with a bit more than 100,000 people
back home and roughly 50,000 outside (World Bank 2011). Even Fiji, a country that
until recently was not perceived as an important source of migrants, has experienced
emigration of around 120,000 citizens since the coups of 1987. In total more than
180,000 Fijians live outside their country (World Bank 2011). This is a huge number,
considering that the country in 2014 had a population of less than 900,000.
The four stages of mobility in Pacific Island countries
The Pacific Islands were first settled by humans from East Asia, who came to the
Pacific Islands in several phases. The first arrived some 40,000 years ago in what today is
called New Guinea. They spread to the Bismarck Archipelago some 7,000 years later and
arrived in what are the Solomon Islands today some 29,000 years ago. These islands belong
to Near Oceania (Matisoo-Smith and Robins 2004). More than 20,000 years later Remote
Oceania was settled from West to East starting from the Reef / Santa Cruz group in the
Solomon Islands throughVanuatu, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. After a pause of 500 –1,000 years
Polynesians then settled the rest of the Polynesian Triangle spreading northwards to
Hawaii, and southwards to New Zealand (Matisoo-Smith and Robins 2004: 9167).
With the arrival of Europeans in the Pacific Ocean a second stage started. In the early
16th century the Pacific Oceans was little more than a seemingly endless body of water
between the Spanish colonies in Asia and the Americas. During this time many islands
were added to European knowledge, their locations drawn into the maps of the Pacific
Ocean. It took until the start of the 19th century before the islands first slowly and then
since the mid-19th century more quickly were economically integrated into a colonial
world system.
Table 1 Population, area and island topography of Pacific Islands countries and territories
Country Sub-
Region





(2013) (around 1960) (km2)1 Zone (km2)1 (per/km2) Islands
Cook Islands Polynesia 15,200 18,378f 240 1,960,135 63 7 0 8 15
Niue 1,500 4,864f 259 316,629 6 0 1 0 1
Samoa 187,400 114,427f 2,934 131,812 64 0 0 2 + 8 islets 2
Tonga 103,300 56,383a 688 664,853 150 a few >100 a few ~170
Tuvalu 10,900 5,444h 26 751,797 419 9 0 0 9
Fed. States of Micronesia Miconesia 103,000 39,284c 700 2,992,597 147 ~600 0 >10 607
Kiribati 180,800 43,336h 726 3,437,345 149 32 1 0 33
Marshall Islands 54,200 13,928c 181 1,992,232 299 34 0 0 34
Nauru 10,500 4,613f 21 308,502 500 0 1 0 1
Palau 17,800 9,344c 487 604,289 37 <300 >10 >5 340
Fiji Islands Melanesia 859,200 345,737a 18,272 1,281,122 47 2 a few <100 ~320
Papua New Guinea 7,398,500 2,184,986i 462,000 2,396,214 16 a few a few >600 >600
Solomon Islands 610,800 124,076d 28,000 1,597,492 22 a few 0 >900 >990
Vanuatu 264,700 78,088k 12,190 827,891 22 0 82 82
Timor Leste 1,066,409 n.k. 15,007 77,256 71 0 0 2 2
sub-totaI 10,812,209 n.k. 541,731 16,347,569
Territory
American Samoa Poly 56,500 20,051e 199 404,391 284 2 0 5 7
French Polynesia Poly 261,400 84,551g 3,660 4,767,242 71 ~80 few ~40 130
Tokelau Poly 1,200 l,870f 12 319,031 100 3 0 0 3
WaIIis & Futuma Poly 12,200 8,546m 143 258,269 85 0 0 2 2
Guam Micro 174,900 67,044e 549 221,504 318 0 0 1 1












Table 1 Population, area and island topography of Pacific Islands countries and territories (Continued)
New Caledonia Mela 259,000 86,519c 18,600 1,422,543 14 0 0 7 7
sub-total 820,900 n.k. 23,620 8,142,248 n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k
overaIl 11,633,109 n.k. 565,351 24,489,817 n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k
a1956 b1957 c1958 d1959 e1960 f1961 g1962 h1963 i1966 k1967 l1968 m1969.
Source: for Population Data: SPC Population Data 2011 and Time Series from 1900 for Island size and island type: Pacific Islands Yearbook, 1989.
1Land Area and EEZ for Pacific Island Countries according to http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/our-partners/member-countries/ EEZ for Pacific Island Territories: http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/ figures for
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ordinated to external interests. Munro (1990: xxxix) estimates that the ‘head-count’,
which is conservative and limited in its own way, enumerated almost one million Pa-
cific Islanders and a further half million Asians who have been involved in the Pacific
labour trade between the 1860s and 1939 (Figure 2).
Some exotic products like sandalwood (Shineberg 1967), sea-cucumber (Beche-de-mer;
Ward 1972) caught the attention of European traders, castaways and adventurers and
became important commodities for European trade with China. Once these exotic
resources had been depleted colonial plantation agricultural for copra, cotton and sugar
cane, to name the most important, provided an economic base for an increasing number
of European settlers arriving in the bigger islands. To operate these plantations a big
number of cheap indentured (contract) labourers was required.
In a few islands colonial plantations were competing with mining activities, for in-
vestment, but more importantly for labour. Very early nickel mining had been taken up
in New Caledonia (1860s). Phosphate mining in Banaba (Ocean Island, today Kiribati),
Nauru, Makatea (today French Polynesia), and Angaur (today Palau) starting at the
early 20th century. This brought many Pacific Islanders, but also labourers from Asia to
these phosphate islands (Firth 1978).
Labour mobility in the mid-19th century led to a distinct demographic reconfigur-
ation of many Pacific Island societies. Today they have meaningful sections from other
Pacific societies, and meaningful Asian population segments.
In the second half of the nineteenth century some 60,000 Pacific Islanders were taken
to Australia by black-birding ships to work in Queensland’s sugar plantations (Flanagan
et al. 2003). Around 10,000 were still living in Australia when the country achieved in-
dependence in 1901. Most of them were repatriated between 1906 and 1908 as a result
of the White Australia Policy. Some 7,500 Pacific Islanders (called Kanakas) working
on plantations in Queensland were deported, and entry into Australia was prohibited
for Pacific Islanders after 1904 (Jupp 2007).
The third stage happened parallel to the second, but is different in a number of as-
pects: colonial powers resettled populations of entire islands within their colonial em-
pire. Such resettlements happened to the people of Banaba (today Kiribati), who were
brought to Rabi Islands (today Fiji) in 1945, Gilbert Islanders (today Kiribati) who were
brought in 1938 to the Phoenix Islands, and then in the 1950s to the Western Province
of today’s Solomon Islands (Campbell 2014). This form of migration seems to resemble
best what people often think of when they speak of resettlement of islands as a result
of climate change: to evacuate the population of entire islands and bring them – as a
group - to their new home.
The fourth stage started towards the end of colonial rule and continues into the years
of independence. When in the 1950s and 1960s in Germany Gastarbeiter (guest
workers) and migrants from Mexico into the USA supported the economic miracle of
the Post War era also in Australia and New Zealand guest workers were needed in rap-
idly expanding economies (Ward 1989). A substantive number of skilled migrants came
from Pacific Island countries, where highly skilled professionals were rather scarce. It
meant a huge loss for sending countries when many of those few professionals left for
greener pastures. At this time all Pacific Island countries were still colonies of European
powers, Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Later when most of the countries had
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made to liberalize immigration policies. New Zealand e.g. granted free entry to Pacific
Islanders in 1986 but the program was discontinued the very same year as too many
immigrants arrived (Goss and Lindquist 2000: 393).
Analysis of labour markets in Pacific Island ACP countries
Labour migration from and to Pacific Island countries reflect on their labour markets
requirements, their need to recruit skilled labour from outside, and their ability to pro-
vide labour to other Pacific Island countries.
Economies of Pacific Island countries are very little diversified. Generally the formal
sector is tiny, and it often consists of a dominating public sector (Table 2). Most whole-
sale businesses are part of the formal sector, while retail businesses are often semi-
formal or informal (Voigt-Graf 2008). They might require licenses to operate, but other
requirements for the formal sector like social security provisions, formal entry require-
ments etc. are either not necessary or not implemented. Only a few Pacific Island coun-
tries have a meaningful modern manufacturing sector concentrating mainly on food
processing (incl. alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages), furniture, textiles and con-
struction materials. The production of consumer electronics (television, computer,
fridges, washing machine, etc.), cars and other motor vehicles, and capital goods is vir-
tually non-existent in any Pacific Island country.
In all Pacific Island countries semi-subsistence agriculture and other rural and urban
informal sectors play a dominant role. Formal sector employment is lowest in Melanes-
ian countries and Timor Leste where the informal sector consists of around 75 percent
(Fiji) to 94 percent (Papua New Guinea) of the workforce. In Micronesia the informal
sector is between 65 percent (Marshall Islands) and 85 percent (Kiribati) while the cor-
responding figures for Polynesia are between 19 percent (Cook Islands) and 37 percent
(Samoa) (Table 2; Booth et al. 2006, World Bank 2006).
Every year a number of young people wish to enter the workforce which is much big-
ger than jobs in the formal sector are available. Data gaps make it difficult to exactly
quantify the number of missing formal employment. Alone in PNG year by year the an-
nual net addition to the labour market is almost 160,000; in Fiji around 19,000 people
join the labour market in a year (Table 2). For the entire Pacific Island region a very
rough estimate is well above 200,000 – a lot if one considers that the formal economy
in Pacific Island countries employs not much more than 500,000 (World Bank 2006).
Many Pacific Island countries have started to scale down their public sectors. Chand
(2006) highlights that the role of the public sector is more or less restricted to create
an enabling environment for the expansion of private sector activities. In some Pacific
Island countries tourism has become a major economic sector, but so far the potentials
are not yet fully utilized. Direct employment in resorts, hotels, restaurants, and trans-
portation as well as spill-over effects to other economic sectors is seen by governments
as a very promising outlook for the future.
Policies and agreements that affect skilled labour mobility
Removing obstacles to the movement of people (as well as goods and services) is in-
creasingly considered a way of contributing to economic development through meeting
identified labour shortages, transferring skills, and increasing remittances (ADB 2008).
Table 2 Pacific ACP - countries - formal and informal employment
formal sector employment (2004)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12















(2013) (% of total
population
2013)
(%) (Nos) (15–64 years old) % of 8
Cook Islands Polynesia 15,200 28.5 72 10,916 7,276 5,900 81 341 22.0 1,376
Niue 1,500 24.7 36 536 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Samoa 187,400 39.0 21 39,096 91,193 57,00 63 5,298 39.0 34,093
Tonga 103,300 37.6 23 23,966 51,842 34,600 67 2,415 22.5 17,224
Tuvalu 10,900 32.8 47 5,121 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 69.5 n.a.
Fed. States of Micronesia Miconesia 103,000 33.8 22 22,688 61,786 15,137 24 3,008 52.5 46,649
Kiribati 180,800 35.3 44 47,398 54,335 7,900 15 2,537 67.0 46,435
Marshall Islands 54,200 40.2 65 35,314 29,634 10,300 35 1,604 48.0 19,334
Nauru 10,500 38.9 100 10,500 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.0 n.a.
Palau 17,800 19.9 77 13,569 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji Islands Melanesia 859,200 28.2 51 435,973 487,450 120,000 25 18,600 38.0 367,450
Papua New Guinea 7,398,500 39.4 13 961,805 3,320,217 187,320 6 159,618 40.0 3,132,897
Solomon Islands 610,800 39.3 20 120,531 239,362 22,177 9 13,320 18.0 217,185
Vanuatu 264,700 36.9 24 64,692 110,976 16,300 15 6,359 30.5 94,676
Timor Leste 1,066,409 43.2 28 298,595 520,265 36874 7 n.a. 47.2 483,391
Sources: Population (Forum Countries) : SPC Pacific Islands Populations - Estimates the projections of demographic indicators of selected years, Sept. 2013, http://www.spc.int/sdd/ on Timor Leste:
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tunities for work purposes. Some have fairly open access to working opportunities
abroad due to special bilateral agreements (e.g. between New Zealand and certain Poly-
nesian states) or some states in the north-western Pacific which have Compact of Free
Association (COFA) status with the USA (Keitner and Michael 2003). People in other
Pacific Island countries are more restricted in their by the immigration policies of des-
tination countries (ACP-Observatory on Migration 2012; see also Table 3).
When the WTO took up its work on January 1, 1995 a new era started for trade be-
tween Developed and Developing Countries. By signing the Marrakesh agreement of
the Uruguay Round of GATT a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was
established for the first time. The provision of GATS (Mode 4) allows temporary labour
mobility for the purpose of service delivery.
Six of the Pacific Island countries (Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and
Vanuatu) are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and covered by its
principles and agreements. The only Asian country amongst the Pacific ACP members,
Timor Leste, hopes that becoming a member of ASEAN will help to boost economic
progress and make labour movement to and from this young Asian country easier
when skilled labour mobility within the ASEAN Economic Community is expected to
become a reality by 2015 when the Asian Economic Community (AEC) is established
(Ibrahim 2007).
The WTO undertook much effort to regulate preferential trade agreements that be-
fore the establishment of the WTO had favoured some countries and disadvantaged
others. Pacific Island countries enjoyed preferential trade with the European Union
through the various Lomé Conventions (Grynberg 1998). With the Cotonou Agreement
of 2000 a phasing out of preferential trade started which was to be concluded through
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and ACP member states at
the latest by the end of 2007 (Rampa 2007).
To become conform with WTO rules these EPAs need to cover substantially all the
trade between the partners (Scollay and Grynberg 2005). While trade under the Lomé
Conventions the EU granted duty-free access of certain goods from ACP countries to
the EU market the EPAs now require ACP countries to follow the principle of reci-
procity in trade, which means that goods produced in the EU enjoy duty-free / duty-
reduced access to the markets of ACP countries (Kimunguyi 2005). Trade between the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the ACP and the EU can continue to be
non-reciprocal under the Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative. For the Pacific Island
countries this includes Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tuvalu, and
Vanuatu (EU 2013).
Negotiations are under way with the European Union for comprehensive Economic Part-
nership Agreement (EPA) with Pacific ACP countries (Kelsey 2007). Fiji and Papua New
Guinea have already interim EPAs which were signed in 2009 and ratified in early 2011
(EU 2014). Overall the progress in achieving a comprehensive EPA of all Pacific ACP
countriesc has been slow and burdensome. In December 2013 Fiji withdrew from the
Pacific ACP trade talks organised by the Forum Secretariat maintaining the need to hold a
regional meeting first without the EU's presence or pressure from the Forum Secretariat.
Developing countries also have preferential market access under various Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) (e.g. the EU, USA, Australia, and New Zealand have such
Table 3 Migration data and schemes for Pacific Island countries and territories
Country Sub-Region Population Stock of Emigrants Stock of emigrants
as % of population
Pacific Access Category






Cook Islands Polynesia 15,200 28.4* 61.4%* Full access to NZ
Niue 1,500 9.2* 75.6%* Full access to NZ
Samoa 187,400 120.4 67.3% 1100 RSE, PSWPS2, SWP
(SQ)
Tonga 103,300 47.4 45.4% 250 RSE, PSWPS1, SWP
Tuvalu 10,900 n.a. n.a. 75 RSE, PSWPS2, SWP Special deal with German
merchant marine
Fed. States of Micronesia Miconesia 103,000 21.9 19.7% Full access to USA (COFA)
Kiribati 180,800 6.4 6.5% 75 RSE, PSWPS1, SWP Special deal with German/ Japanese
merchant marine
Marshall Islands 54,200 10.5 16.6% Full access to USA (COFA)
Nauru 10,500 n.a. n.a. PSWPS2, SWP
Palau 17,800 8.0 38.8% Full access to USA (COFA)
Fiji Islands Melanesia 859,200 182.2 21.3% ** RSE**
Papua New Guinea 7,398,500 61.2 0.9% PSWPS1, SWP
Solomon Islands 610,800 5.4 1.0% PSWPS2, SWP
Vanuatu 264,700 3.9 1.6% RSE, PSWPS1, SWP
Timor Leste 1,066,409 n.a. n.a. SWP
Territory
American Samoa Poly 66,692 45.7 66.7% Full access to USA
French Polynesia Poly 271,831 4.2 1.5% Full access to France
(incl. French Pacific territories)












Table 3 Migration data and schemes for Pacific Island countries and territories (Continued)
WaIIis & Futuma Poly 13,193 n.a. n.a. (incl. French Pacific territories)
Guam Micro 192,090 48.7 27.1% Full access to USA
Northern Mariana Islands Micro 63,517 8.9 10.1% Full access to USA
New Caledonia Mela 252,331 2.9 0.9% Full access to France
(incl. French Pacific territories)
Sources: for Population Data: SPC Population Data 2011 and Time Series from 1900; Migration rates and opportunity: Ware 200, information of emigrants: World Bank 2012 (except * Appleyard anf Stahl 1995); n.a. (not
available) New Zealand government announced the “Recognized Seasonal Employer” (RSE) policy in October 2006 and it began in April 2007. Under RSE there are up to 8000 places available per year. Australia
launched the “Pacific Islands Seasonal Workers Pilot Scheme” (PSWPS1) in Aug 2008, in September 2011 more countries were added (PSWPS2). The scheme ended in June 2012 and has been replaced by the Seasonal
Worker Program (SWP), in which started on July 1, 2012 providing up to 12,000 places horticulture, accommodation providers, aquaculture venture and cotton and cane growers https://employment.gov.au/seasonal-
worker-program.
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developing countries (Herz and Wagner 2011). The EU has been revising its GSP, ex-
cluding a number of countries that earlier had been covered (e.g. Fiji and PNG, which
now fall under Economic Partnership Agreement Market Access Regulations, EU
2013). From the Pacific Island countries Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, and Tonga have market access to the EU through
the GSP (EU 2013). The EU also has introduced a GSP + facility, which provides add-
itional preferences to countries which ratify and implement 27 international conven-
tions on core human and labour rights, the environment and good governance (Verma
and Elman 2007, Switzer 2008). None of the 15 Pacific ACP countries at the moment
qualifies for GSP + preferential market access to the EU (EU 2013a).
Pacific Island countries have negotiated (and are right now negotiating) a variety bi-
lateral, regional and international trade agreements. The oldest of these agreements is
the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA),
which started in 1981 and granted Forum Island countries preferential (non-reciprocal)
access to Australia and New Zealand for a specified selection of goods originating from
FICs (Gold and Thakur 1982, Rolfe 2007). The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agree-
ment (PICTA) between Forum Island countries (except Australia and New Zealand)
entered into force in 2003. In 2012 a Trade in Services agreement was added to PICTA
(PICTA TIS), which also has the provision of a Temporary Movement of Natural Per-
sons (TMNP) protocol (Mahadevan and Asafu‐Adjaye, 2013). The TMNP protocol
however is not yet open to signature.
Another regional trade agreement is the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Trade
Agreement between Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji),
which started in 1993. In 2012 the MSG also introduced a Skills Movement Scheme
(SMS) (MSG 2012).
At international levels agreements include the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic
Relations (PACER), which includes the Pacific Island countries, Australia and New
Zealand (Gathii 2011, Kelsey 2006). PACER actually was not designed as a Free Trade
Agreement, but as a safety valve for Australia and New Zealand for the case that any
Forum Island Country (FIC) commences negotiations on Free Trade Agreements with
other developed countries (e.g. with the EU). Such negotiations then was to trigger the
need for consultations with Australia and New Zealand and negotiations for a Free
Trade Agreement between those FICs who commenced negotiations for free trade
agreements with other developed countries and Australia and New Zealand (Gathii
2011, Gupta 2008). Besides this PACER stipulated that negotiations between the FICs
and Australia and New Zealand for a Free Trade Agreement needed to start not more
than eight years after PICTA came into force (Kelsey 2004). Negotiations for PACER-
Plus, the proposed free trade agreement between the Forum Island Countries and
Australia and New Zealand, were launched at the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders meet-
ing in August 2009 (PIFS 2009).
In all the agreements that are currently under negotiation Pacific Island countries are
eager to include regulations about labour mobility (GATS Mode 4 and beyond). Under
PACER-Plus they hope that uni-laterally established (un-skilled) temporary labour mo-
bility schemes by Australia and New Zealand can be made more sustainable and bind-
ing, if PACER-Plus includes aspects of temporary labour mobility. Chances seem to be
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Australian and New Zealand labour markets will result from the talks – a prospect that
would leave many island nations without a key incentive to remain at the negotiating
table (Morgan 2012; PIFS 2009).
In the 2010 and 2011 annual reports of the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser
(OCTA) Regional Labour Mobility (beyond Mode 4) is listed as a priority agreed by
Forum Trade Ministers in October 2009. On its website OCTA stresses that for many
FICs, regional labour mobility (beyond Mode 4) is the key, if not the most important,
issue in PACER Plus negotiations. Many Pacific Island Countries think that PACER
Plus will not lead to mutually beneficial and development enhancing economic integration
unless it results in greater integration of labour markets in the region. Australia has recog-
nised the importance of labour mobility, but maintains it is a complex area of negotiations
(http://www.octapic.org/pacer-plus-nearing-conclusion-says-chief-trade-adviser/). Pacific
leaders also hope that PACER-Plus increases labour mobility between Island countries (Fiji
Times, 17 March 2013).
Pacific ACP countries made a similar experience in the negotiations for EPAs (or a
comprehensive EPA between the EU and Pacific ACP countries). The PACPS are tar-
geting an annual quota of 10,000 semi-skilled and intermediate trainees (IT) from the
PACPS to work in EU member countries under the EPA (PANG 2007). The EU is very
hesitant to include the mobility of temporary labour in the EPA negotiations (Manser-
visi and Falkenberg 2006; Rampa 2007).
Analysis of skilled and unskilled labour mobility from Pacific Island countries
Faist and Fauser (2011) highlight important changes in migration paradigms: they no-
tice the desirability of temporary labour migration based on the expectation that tem-
porary migrants will constitute no loss in human capital and furthermore transmit a
higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants. Such temporary labour
migration can also help to spread the benefits of migration widely and create familiar-
ities with destination countries. Temporary labour migration can help Pacific Islanders
acquire skills, knowledge and insights that can become crucial when they later have to
leave their home countries for good.
Stahl and Appleyard (2007) hint at the development aspects of programmes by New
Zealand and Australia to grant permanent access to people from Pacific Island coun-
tries for work purposes. New Zealand has granted citizenship to the people of the Cook
Islands, Niue and Tokelau. The country also has a quota for Samoan citizen under
which 1,100 Samoan nationals annually can become permanent residents. This Samoan
quota exists since 1970. The Pacific Access Category (PAC) of 2002 allows 250 persons
from Fijid, 250 from Tonga, 75 from Kiribati and 75 from Tuvalu to become permanent
citizens. Under the SQ and PAC people from Pacific Island countries, who would not
qualify under the general programs for skilled immigrants as their skills levels are often
too low can enter New Zealand (see also Table 3).
Australia and New Zealand have also bilateral agreements with a number of Pacific
Island countries in the area of seasonal migration of unskilled labour, such as the
Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy New Zealand introduced in 2007 and a
similar scheme Australia launched a year later. Such schemes had existed in the late
1960s for Fijian, Tongan and Samoans to work mainly in agriculture and forestry until
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RSE policy, at present, up to 8,000 persons from (in order of absolute importance)
Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati can come to New
Zealand for seasonal agricultural work. The Australian scheme allows people from
Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and
(since 2012) Timor Leste to enter Australia for seasonal unskilled employment mainly
in the agricultural sector. Other economic sectors showed interest in employing tem-
porary workers from the Pacific such as the New Zealand dairy and meat processing
industries.
In the extension of the Australian scheme in 2012 a three year trial for labour recruit-
ment to the tourism industry has been announced. Cotton and sugar cane growers as
well as fisheries have become part of this trial which provides 1,500 jobs. Gibson and
McKenzie (2011) suggest that the New Zealand RSE can make a meaningful develop-
ment contribution to Pacific Island nations. Walmsley et al. (2009) argue that Australia
and New Zealand would gain considerably from increasing quotas, particularly on un-
skilled labour and also the Pacific Island economies gained a lot from sending unskilled
labour to Australia and New Zealand.
Initiatives taken up by metropolitan countries or by Pacific Island countries on labour
mobility are highly controversial. Some see in them a return to the nineteenth century
when colonial labour trade was (mis)used to develop the Australian economy. Others
see them as a way to bring development to Pacific Island countries. Opening Pacific
Islands’ economies even more to imports from Australia and other countries to the dis-
advantage of their own, rather fragile and vulnerable economies might be easier to bear
when labour mobility becomes a binding part of trade agreements.
However, it is very unlikely that Australia or New Zealand will give away the right to
regulate labour movements considering benefits and potential threats to their own
economies.
Larger Pacific Island countries, in particular Fiji and Papua New Guinea, train big
numbers of professionals and graduates year by year. Many leave, making their skills
available to others. The skills movement scheme of the MSG tries to balance labour
supply and demand within the four economies of the MSG group. However, such
schemes can only be successful if a bigger number of skilled labourers that are willing
and able to migrate chose to go to a Pacific Island country rather than migrate to a
metropolitan country. To make this happen requires incentives—incentives in terms of
attractive wages, working conditions and living qualities. It also requires the establish-
ment of a Pacific identity, where it becomes a value in itself to live and work in a coun-
try that culturally is similar to where migrants come from.
Such considerations also become relevant when places for people need to be found
that leave their homes because of climate change. It is now the time to equip people
with skills that enable them to positively contribute to the societies that are supposed
to receive them. It is equally important that there is a Pacific Island identity that sees it
natural to help out and welcome those who need support, who need new homes.
Environmentally-induced migration in the Pacific Islands
Pacific Islands have figured prominently in discourses about environmentally induced
migration. Sea-level rise, the increase in intensity of natural hazards, the destruction of
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At the same time they are social events: they create spaces of consideration, of discourses,
of fear and assumption about an unsure and an unknown future. This is, in particular, true
for the fate of those who live in places that might be submerged some time in the future.
It is obvious that changes in environmental quality can make people leave their
homes. Still the terminology “environmental refugees” is rejected by many. Legal frame-
works about refugees don’t accept environmental reasons when granting refugee status.
There is little doubt that Pacific Island countries are much exposed to the impacts of
climate change. There is also little doubt that many Pacific Island countries have been
a source region for big numbers of emigrants. The question is, if there are indications
that climate change and migration in the Pacific have been related in the past and if for
the future one can expect big numbers of people from Pacific Island countries who are
driven away from their homes.
The search for well-being and security is the major reason why people migrate (Gasper
2011). Hau’ofa (1993) described the pre-colonial Pacific as a ‘sea of islands’ within which
people moved freely and frequently, created social networks, traded and exchanged goods,
and at times engaged in conflict and attempted to exert dominance over one another (cited
in Lee 2009: 1). Mobility within the Pacific Islands region created pluralistic, multicultural,
transnational societies that benefited much from the mixing of people.
Small Island States are amongst those countries that are most exposed to various im-
pacts of climate change. They “have characteristics which make them especially vulner-
able to the effects of climate change, sea-level rise and extreme events” (IPCC, 2007:
15; IPCC 2012: 184). Their high vulnerability is intensified by low adaptation capacities
and capabilities.
The main climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands are flooding, tropical
storms (cyclones and hurricanes) and drought. Sea-level rise as a slow inset, low inten-
sity hazard can make whole atoll island states disappear. Such hazards and risks, envir-
onmental, economic and social, and climate change and its impacts are major threats
to development achievements (Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2010). Within a few
decades these island states could become uninhabitable and people have to move.
Campbell et al. (2010) have identified 86 cases of relocation in Pacific Islands between
1920 and 2000. 50 of them are related to environmental conditions. In the very near fu-
ture resettlement most likely will increase tremendously. In February 2014 Fiji’s Presi-
dent affirmed to the people of Kiribati “that you will not be refugees […]. You will be
able to migrate with dignity […]. If the sea level continues to rise because the inter-
national community won’t tackle global warming, some or all people of Kiribati may
have to come and live in Fiji” (President Nailatikau quoted in Fiji Sun, Feb. 14, 2014).
End of May 2014 the Government of Kiribati purchased 5,460 acres of land on Vanua
Levu, Fiji’s second biggest island for AUS$9.3 million (Fiji Broadcast Corporation, May 29th,
2014)e. Although President Tong stressed that the land purchased is to strengthen Kiribati’s
food security, and not for relocation of I-Kiribati people, there are many who suggest that
this was only done to contain the political impact of such move back home in Kiribati.
In Fiji a big number of relocation activities have already started. In January 2014 Fiji’s
Prime Minister announced that 676 communities have been identified that are threatened
by sea-level rise generated by climate change; 42 of them shall be relocated within the next
10 years (Nailatikau 2014).
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People living in the Pacific Islands are not isolated from events elsewhere. Through
media and their own experience they learn that there are different kinds of migrants,
and that in not all of the cases migration brings the outcomes people hope for. There
always have been asymmetries when it came to various forms of mobility.
Labour immigration is vital to many countries. Countries like Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and the USA are built on migration, on ‘good immigrants’. Refugees however are
often perceived as ‘bad migrants”, as people who enter countries illegally, misuse social
security and welfare provisions of these countries and threaten the well-being and even
physical security of the law-abiding citizens of these countries. Often the public does not
realise (or admit) that these people face prosecution, are displaced and depend on support
from outside. It seems that the legal protection of refugees adds rigour to the attempt of
countries to keep their borders tight and to prevent that such people even reach the
territory of countries to seek the status of refugee. If they do so then there usually is a long
process waiting for asylum seeker, which often deprive them of basic rights.
There is little reason to assume that this will be different when climate-change
refugees from Pacific Islands are knocking on the doors of their powerful neighbours.
In the Pacific in particular Australia has become an example of relentless refugee pol-
icies which many see as a violation of the relevant conventions for refugees and human
rights. People living in countries that soon might disappear from the world map are
frightened that then they will be exposed to inhumane treatment like today asylum
seeker in Australian detention centres in Papua New Guinea and Nauru: locked away
for indefinite time, with few rights and even less opportunities to decide over their
lives. Keeping this in mind it looks sarcastic that life-styles like those in Australia seem
to be the most important cause for climate change, for the misery many Pacific
Islanders will suffer in a few decades from now despite having contributed nothing to it.
Knowing that in a few decades they might have to look for places where they can live
Pacific Islanders are not eager to become environmental refugees, even if this would
become legally possible. Leaders of Pacific Island countries emphasise again and again
that they do not want their people to be seen as potential environmental refugees.
Kiribati President Anote Tong, for example, does not leave any doubt that he is aware
that a time might come when the 32 atolls of his country are no more unsuitable to
provide a home to the people of Kiribati. President Tong has started to find alternatives
for more than 100,000 people, but not as environmental refugees, but to allow them to
‘migrate in dignity’.
Considering the hostile attitude towards refugees it seems prudent to work towards
solutions within Pacific Islands that enhances South-South cooperation and solidarity
and resists to new dependencies towards former colonial masters. Metropolitan powers
however have a role to play: they should meet their obligations in helping Pacific Island
countries to generate capacities so that people can contribute to the societies of the
countries receiving them.
Conclusion
Pacific Islanders have been mobile since people started settling in this part of the world.
They always contributed to the betterment of societies they received tham. The near fu-
ture will show, if a new stage of migration becomes dominant: the migration of people
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much has to be learnt from historical examples of migration, in particular those, where
asymmetries of power resulted in dependencies and exploitation as a result of migra-
tion. To make people climate change refugees will compromise their right to live in
dignity. All over the world migrants who can contribute to the societies of destination
countries are less endangered to become socially isolated and not welcome.
The challenge is best taken up amongst the Pacific Island countries. Solidarity based
on similar histories and cultural traits should make this easier to happen. Many Pacific
Island countries already have meaningful populations of other Pacific Island countries.
Challenges arising from climate and environmental change have the potential to
strengthen Pacific Island identity and can show that the people in the Pacific Islands
are able to master these challenges. Still financial support from metropolitan countries
will be required to strengthen capacities in the Pacific Islands. Such support should not
create new dependencies and increase existing ones, but should be based on the re-
sponsibilities the countries at the Pacific Rim have as the contributed to the challenge
of climate change through their degree of industrialization and unsustainable lifestyles
as major sources of emissions of greenhouse gases.
Today we do not even know the number of (additional) migrants because of climate
change. In the face of slow environmental change, those who are able to move—those
with money, social networks and alternative livelihoods—may migrate independently.
The vulnerable poor, those with no capacity to move when environments deteriorate,
the young and elderly may be left behind or forced to resettle later (Warner and Laczko
2008: 60). These then will become climate-change refugees: with few capacities and
skills, little wanted by countries that should receive them, dependent on support and
benevolence, and endangered to become a pawn in political in-fighting.
There is even the possibility of people being left behind in adverse environments.
Such fear is not baseless: the majority of people in the so-called developed world bother
little when people (already now) are living under extremely adverse environmental and/
or social conditions. Evacuating (Kelman 2008) sinking islands in the Pacific most likely
will not happen. It is more likely that the last plane and ship leaves Kiribati (or Tuvalu)
and people are still there, not forgotten, but never intended to be brought to safety,
neither socially nor environmentally.
Endnotes
aThe term Pacific Islands countries in the context of this paper refers to 15 Pacific
ACP states; 14 of them are organized in the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) plus
Timor Leste, an island state that is geographically situated in Asia.
bThroughout the paper the modern names of island countries and territories are
used.
cTimor Leste is not included in the Economic Partnership Agreement, but it has an
observer status and most likely would be able to join once the agreement is ready to be
signed.
dFiji joined the scheme in 2003, and after the coup of 2006, Fiji’s participation in the
scheme discontinued.
e5,460 acres (22.1 km2) is considerably bigger than South Tarawa (15.76 km2) where
almost half of Kiribati’s population is living.
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